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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF trrAB
JERALD L. KILPACK, individually
and as Guard1an ad litem for
Jess Allred Kilpack, a minor,
Plaintiff and
Appellant,

Case No. 16175

vs.
LaMARK WIGNALL and DAVID WIGNALL,
Defendants and
Respondents.

BRIEF OF APPELLANTS

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On June 21, 1976, Defendants LaMark Wignall and
David Wignall took five small children, including Jess Allred
Kilpack, then barely age 7, to a hayfield, where Defendants
commenced gathering hay bales.

Jess Allred Kilpack was permitted

to climb out the cab of the truck down onto the running board
and to ride there, watching two slightly older boys jump off and
on the running board for 15 or 20 minutes.

Jess Kilpack then

attempted to jump off the running board onto a bale of hay, but
slipped and was run over by the rear dual wheels of the truck,
thereby suffering near fatal, extensive, permanent injuries.
On November 15, 1976, the father of Jess Kilpack brought suit in
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Utah County against Defendants, seeking recovery for his son's
injuries and recovery of medical expenses.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
On March 6, 1978, trial was commenced before a Utah

County jury, the Honorable Allen B. Sorensen presiding. Plaintiff's counsel attempted to voir dire the jury as to several
matters, and after the testimony of the first witness was completed, Defendants' counsel moved for a mistrial on the basis of
part of the attempted voir dire, and the Court granted the motion.
The case was tried before a second jury on October 2, 3 and 4,
1978.

At the close of the evidence, Plaintiff moved the Court

for a directed verdict on the liability issues.

The trial Court

denied the motion and denied a motion made by Defendants for a
directed verdict on the liability issues in Defendants' favor.
The case was submitted to the jury at noon on October 4, 1978,
and after returning from lunch, the jury announced it had reached
a verdict.

The jury answered the first interrogatory of the

special verdict, which inquired as to whether the Defendants, or
either of them, were negligent, "No", and did not answer the
balance of the questions, except for a portion of a damage interrogatory.

The Court entered a judgment on the verdict "no cause

of action" and later denied Plaintiff's Hotions for Judgment
Notwithstanding the Verdict and for a New Trial.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Plaintiff seeks reversal of the "no cause of action"
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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verdict and reversal of the lower court's denial of Plaifttlff'a
Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict and MotiOD !or
a New Trial, and a new trial on the issue of damages on proper
instructions, and a determination by this Court that the queatloaa
asked, and the other questions sought to be asked of the flrat
jury were proper inquiries, and should have been allowed

~

the

lower court.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Resolution of the legal issues of Defendants' negligence
and any negligence of the injured minor child requires a review
of the evidence on those issues, for the purpose of determining
whether reasonable persons could reach different conclusions.
The following statement of facts will first
recap the evidence on the negligence issues, witness by witness:
Four witnesses testified concerning the facts and circumstances of the accident:

Joel Kilpack, age 9 at the time, one

of the other children that accompanied Defendants to the hayfield,
Jess Kilpack, then age 7, the injured child, and each of the
Defendants.
The record on appeal contains two partial transcripts.
The transcript which contains the testimony of the two children
from the time they arrived at the hayfield with Defendants to the
time of the accident, and the entire testimony of each of the
Defendants,is contained in the 90-page partial transcript which
has been marked by the Court Clerk Number

143.

It is to this
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transcript that the below references pertaining to the testimony
of the two children and Defendants' testimony are made.
Joel Kilpack testified that Defendants and the five
children rode to the field in a red flatbed haytruck (owned by
Defendant LaMark Wignall) and that when the truck arrived at the
hayfield, the three youngest children, Jess Kilpack, age 7,
Debbie Wilson, age 6, and Dennis Wilson, age 5, got in the cab
of the truck with Defendant David Wignall, and that he (Joel
Kilpack) and Danny Wilson, both age 9, jumped on the running
board on the passenger side of the truck after it started, and
were thereafter off and on the running board two or three times
as the truck proceeded through the hayfield before the accident
occurred.

(Tr. 3-5, 22, 25)

Joel testified that after he and

Danny Wilson had mounted the running board of the moving truck
they took turns holding on to the brace which held the outside
mirror frame on the passenger side of the truck, and would jump
back and forth between the running board and bales of hay as they
passed a short distance from the running board.

(Tr. 4-5)

He

stated that the hay bales were about two feet out from the running
board and that the tops of the bales were about six inches lower
than the running board.

(Tr. 13-14)

After playing on the running

board for a while in the manner mentioned, and then jumping off
and running to arrange hay bales, Joel Kilpack and Danny Wilson
returned and jumped on the running board, but found that the
running board was then crowded because Jess Kilpack and Dennis
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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1
Wilson were then riding on the running board, so Joel and
Danny Wilson actually boosted Dennis Wilson, age 5, back through
the passenger window into the cab. (Tr. 5-61 Ex. 4 and 5)
Joel further testified that Danny Wilson slipped off the runniDg
board as the truck was moving along and that Jess had to help
him clamber back on the running board because he was dragging
along as the truck moved.

(Tr. S-6, 101 Ex. 6)

Joel Kilpack

further testified that he heard no instructions, comments, or
warnings at all as he and Danny jumped off and on the running
board, played on the running board, boosted the 5-year old child
back up from the running board into the cab of the moving truck,
and that as he rode and played on the running board he could plainly
see Defendant LaMark Wignall in the back of the truck, moving to
place hay bales, and Defendant David Wignall driving the truck.
(Tr. 9-10, 22)

Joel explained that the truck was moving at about

5 miles per hour all the time, and that the truck was making noise,
and that there was additional noise from the ferris wheel loader
as the truck proceeded through the field.

(Tr. 12, 23)

He explained

that he had never before been out in the hayfield or riding the
truck, but that he had no feeling of danger and felt his activities
were fun.

(Tr. 16, 24)

He said that the truck had been in the

hayfield 10 or 15 minutes gathering hay bales at the time Jess
Kilpack was run over.

(Tr. 14)

Jess Kilpack testified that he recalled no instructions
as to where he was to ride when the truck arrived at the field, but
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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that he joined Debbie and Dennis Wilson in the cab (Tr. 29)
After the truck started down through the field, he saw Joel Kilpack
and Danny Wilson on the running board, and jumping back and forth
holding on to the mirror and that he crawled out of the window
down onto the running board while the truck was moving, and that
he recalled no instructions or admonishments from either of the
Defendants about his crawling out of the window.

(Tr. 29)

He

testified that Dennis Wilson, the 5-year old, then crawled out
of the window and that Joel Kilpack and Danny Wilson then pushed
him back into the cab, but that nothing was said about that procedure by either of the Defendants, and that after he watched Joel
and Danny Wilson straightening bales he jumped off the running
board onto a bale and slipped under the wheels of the partially
loaded haytruck.

(Tr. 29-30)

He estimated that he rode the running

board for 6 to 10 minutes before he jumped and slipped under the
wheels.

(Tr. 30-31)

On cross-examination, he said that he had

been out on the running board
fell under the wheels.

about 4 minutes before he jumped anc

(Tr. 34)

Exhibit "8", a photograph,

illustrates the manner in which Jess Kilpack attempted to jump froc
the running board onto a bale of hay when he slipped under the
wheels.

(Tr. 33; Ex. 8) Jess Kilpack testified that nothing was

said to him and he could recall nothing being said to Joel Kilpacl
or Danny Wilson about their riding on the running board, nor when
the 5-year old was pushed back up into the cab (Tr. 33-34)

He

also testified that the truck was traveling approximately 5 milef
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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per hour before and at the time he jumped off and wa• cru•bed
under the rear dual wheels, and that the truck had been in OODtinuous motion from the time it started down through the bayfield.
(Tr. 39)

He had never before ridden on the running board of any

moving vehicle and did not know it was dangerous to do eo.
41)

(~.

When asked on cross-examination why he jumped off the running

board, he stated:

" Cause I was going to go play with Joel and

Danny, straightening the bales." (Tr. 42)

Jess testified that he

could see David Wignall driving the truck while riding the running
board, and that nothing had been said to him by Joel or Danny
about jumping off and that he recalled nothing being said by either
of the Defendants about his

activities.

(Tr. 44)

He did recall

on ·cross-examination that someone told him to get into the cab after
the truck arrived at the field.

(Tr. 46)

Defendant David Wignall is the son of Defendant LaMark
Wignall and the oldest of six children.
at the time of the accident.

He was 20 years of age

(Tr. 49-50)

David Wignall described the equipment and features of
the flatbed 1964 Dodge ton-and-a-half truck used in the hay bale
gathering operation.

It had a flat bed with sides, but was not

enclosed in back, and had a running board only on the passenger side
and outside mirrors; however, the glass was broken out of the mirror
on the passenger side, but the frame was still attached to the
truck.

(Tr. 53-54; Ex. 1, 3, 4, 5, and 8)

David Wignall heard

one of the children ask Defendant LaMark Wignall whether the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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children could go when the parties were at the Wignall farm house
prior to leaving in the truck for the field: "One of the kids
asked Dad if they could go, and he said something like, 'I don't
care', or something like that."

(Tr. 55)

David Wignall further

testified that neither he nor Defendant LaMark Wignall advised
or informed anyone at the house, including the older sisters of
some of the five children, or anyone else, of the children's
desire to be taken to the field and the Defendants willingness
to take them: that Defendant LaMark Wignall drove the truck to
the field, where a ferris wheel bale loader was attached, and that
he then proceeded to drive the truck while Defendant LaMark Wignall
took a position in the back of the truck to receive and stack the
bales: and that he could not remember whether anything at all was
said to the children at that time respecting what they should do
or what positions they should take.

(Tr. 55-56)

Defendant David

Wignall further testified that the truck had come back and forth
in the field, changing directions one or more times prior to the
accident; that it was necessary for him to maneuver the truck to
some extent in a zigzag fashion so that the bales could feed into
the ferris wheel loader; that he observed and watched the operatioc
of the bale loader by using the mirror on the driver's side of
the truck, and that at the time he was somewhat in a hurry to get
in the hay and was aware that he had the five children along,
including Jess Kilpack, from the time the truck was driven from t~
house to the field

(Tr. 56-58)

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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,
David Wignall testified that he did observe the activities of the 9-year old boys jumping up and riding on the runaia9
board and then off again.

(Tr. 58-59)

When asked whether he

also observed the 9-year old children jumping back and forth between the bales and the running board, Defendant David Wignall
stated:

"No, I didn't.

I couldn't tell if they was hopping.

From what I could tell they were just sticking their foot out and
kind of kicking the bale."

David Wignall admitted that he was

able to observe a portion of the children's bodies above the bottom
of the open passenger window, to wit, probably from their shoulders
on up, and that he recalled that all three of the smaller children,
Debbie, age 6, Jess, age 7, and Dennis, age 5, crawled out of the
window and David did say something to them about getting back in,
to-wit:

"I told them to get back in the cab."

(Tr. 60)

This

instruction, however, was not given until after the children were
already out,

and thereafter two of the children got back in but

Jess Kil?ack stayed out on the running board, and that after the
truck started down the field, the only time he stopped the truck
was not for the children to get back in the cab, but for the bales
getting stuck up in the ferris wheel, and that he stopped the truck
only once or twice the whole time the truck was in the field prior
to the accident.

(Tr. 60-61)

Defendant David Wignall said nothing

at all to the three small children other than just to get back in,
and made no effort to enforce it, and said nothing at all to the
two 9-year old children about jumping back and forth on and off the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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OCR, may contain errors.
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running board all the while the truck was proceeding, and that
except for one or two stops for hay bale jam ups, he drove five
miles an hour.

(Tr. 61)

Defendant David Wignall testified that

the bales were arriving at the Ferris Wheel "every five or ten
seconds"

(his deposition) or "between ten to fifteen seconds"

(his testimony at trial).

(Tr. 62-63).

Defendant David Wignall

admitted that he could see Jess Kilpack riding out on the running
board prior to the time he jumped and that it was "probably about
fifteen minutes or so" after the children went out the window onto
the running board to the time of the accident, and that only a
total of approximately twenty minutes of elapsed time expired from
the time the truck started in the hay field until the time of the
(Tr. 63-64)

accident.

During his deposition, Defendant David

Wignall testified that it was Jess Kilpack who first crawled out
the window.

(Tr. 64)

David Wignall admitted that he regarded the

five children as being a kind of a nuisance out on the hay bale
gathering operation.

(Tr. 65)

During David Wignall's examination by his own counsel,
he further described that it was necessary for the truck to vary
from a straight course to go out and gather a hay bale; that it
was necessary for him to look out the window on the driver's side
to see that the bale was lined up properly; and that the attention
he was required to devote to the picking up of the hay bales was
"almost absolute"; that he thought Joel Kilpack may have been out
on a prior trip; that Danny Wilson had been out on a prior trip,
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR,
may contain errors.
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but on prior trips none of the children were permitted to ride on
the running board; and that there were many times when he had enough
time to look to the right to see what the kids were doing on the
running board, and that what he saw looking to the right "most of
the time was just Danny and Joel were out standing there.

I don't

know, talking and from what I could see, kicking the bales as they
would go by".

(Tr. 65-67)

Further, in answer to questions pro-

pounded by his own counsel, David Wignall stated that at the time
Jess Kilpack was run over, between a quarter and a half load of
hay had been gathered; that it took forty-five minutes to an hour
to get a full load; that the bales would get stuck probably three
or four times requiring stopping the truck momentarily for each
full load; that the bales of hay passing the truck on the passenger
side would vary in distance from the truck from right against the
running board to probably three or four feet away; and that the
top of the bales of hay relative to the level of the running board
on the passenger side would probably be about even
of inches either way.

or a couple

(Tr. 67, 69-70)

Defendant LaMark Wignall testified that he has a B.S.
Degree in Education from B.Y.U., taught school, primarily the 5th
grade, but had had occasion to teach children in the 4th grade as
well and that his duties in the grade school included at times
supervision of children on the playground and other areas and that
he was aware of the nature and propensity and capabilities of
children six, seven, eight and nine years old.

(Tr. 73-74)

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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He stated that he was the owner of the 1974 Dodge Ton & one-half
truck and he described a few differences in the equipment on the
truck as depicted in the illustrative photographs from the equipment on the truck at the time of the accident.
the photographs depict a tail gate, also a

In this regard,
black portion

above the sides of the truck and glass in the outside mirror on
the right-hand side, which items were not present on the truck
at the time Jess Kilpack was run over.

(Tr. 74-75: Exhibits 1,3-6,8!

LaMark Wignall testified that neither of the two Kilpack
children had been out in the field on any prior load; that he had
no discussion with any of the children's mothers prior to taking
the children to the hay field and no discussions with two older
qirls

at the home about taking the smaller children to the

hay field and that he was asked for and granted permission to
children to go to the field.

(Tr. 75-77)

the

As to instructions

given the children at the time the truck arrived in the field,
Defendant LaMark Wignall stated:
"When we stopped the truck in the field
and the Ferris Wheel was being hooked up I told
them that they could not ride in the back, since
hay would be coming in there and that they would
either have to get in the cab or clear out away
from the truck into the field".
(Tr. 77)
Defendant

Lal1ark Wignall

said that the Ferris Wheel

loader was capable of being raised and lowered in height from the
back of the truck without requiring the operator to get down on
the ground and that he would walk back and forth taking the bales
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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from the Ferris Wheel loader and stacking them first either along
the side or up at the front.

(Tr. 78)

He stated that he noticed

the two older boys out away from the truck some distance into the
field when the truck first started, but that he did not observe
anything further respecting the activities of the two nine-year
olds.

(Tr. 78-79)
As to the activities of the three smaller children

climbing down onto the running board, Defendant LaMark Wignall
testified as follows in his deposition and admitted his answers
were correctly given when examined about the same subject matter
at trial:
Question:
"You noticed some actiivity of the
kids getting outside of the truck. One or more
of the three I guess?"
Answer:

"Yes."

Question:
"What did you observe in that
regard? Where were they and what were they doing?"
Answer:
"I seem to remember that some of
them were climbing out of the window on to the
running board of the truck. The height of the
bed and my activity was with the hay -- I
wasn't paying attention to what the children
were doino.
I was occupied with the hay, and
the height of the truck made it difficult for
me to see them. "
Q:

"Do you recall giving that answer at

that time?"
A:

"Yes."

Q:

"Was that answer correctly given?"

A:

"It was correct when given, I guess."

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library.
-13Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Q: "Okay. With reference to that activity,
noticing the kids down there on the
your
running board, did you given them any instructions
or take any action at that time?"
A:

"No, I don't think so."

(Tr. 80)

LaMark Wignall said the truck was about one-fourth
loaded at the time the child was run over and that the truck had
been in the field about twenty minutes before the accident and
would have been traveling at a speed of between five to eight
miles an hour.

(Tr. 81)

Defendant LaMark Wignall further admitted

that he had experience with his own six children not hearing or
not seeming to hear instructions and had had experience on play
grounds seeing children's interests and activities and being
around activities appearing fun and exciting and was aware of
children's interests in being along and participating in anything
that looks exciting.

(Tr. 82)

Upon cross examination by Defendant's own counsel,
Defendant LaMark Wignall recalled his explanation in his deposition
that as he placed hay bales on the truck and because of the height
of the bed, it was difficult for him to see what was going on on
the running board,

(Tr. 85), and that his observation relative to

the activities of the children getting down on the running board
would have been made closer to the beginning of operations rather
than just before the child was run over.

(Tr. 86-87)

On redirect

LaMark Wignall testified as follows:
Q:
"Wasn't it of assistance to have those
hay bales straightened around to where they could
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1"•.
feed directly into the baler?•
A: "The straighter they were the better, yes.•

Q: "You were aware that Danny had been out
earlier doing that and the boys were running ahead
to do this, were you not? The olders ones?•
A: "Danny had been out on prior loads. They
weren't running ahead of the truck, however.•
Q: "On prior loads?"

A: "At any time. They were off to the side,
off in the field, straightening up, making rows.•

Q: "Yes. Ahead of the truck in the sense
that after they straightened the bales, the truck
would come along and pick them up?"
A:

"Yes."

Q:
"Whether or not it was difficult to see
the activity of the children, you did see the
children, some activity, on the running board, did
you not?"

A:
board."

"Yes, I noticed they were on the running

Q:

"That was before the accident?"

A:

"Yes."

Q:
"When its noisy, when children are noisy
or the machine is noisy, then its necessary to really
yell to get their attention if they are in a hazardous position, isn't it?"
A: "Say it again, please."
Q:
"lllhen its noisy, background noise, you have
to raise your voice at children?"

A:

"Yes."

Q:

"Have you done that commonly?"

A:

"I have done it."

(Tr. 87-88)

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-15-

The foregoing testimony was the evidence respecting
the negligence issues.
The facts relative to the issue of misconduct of the
jury are as follows:
The trial court's instruction number 9 directed the jury
to return a special verdict in the form of written answers to
special written questions.

In

th~

last sentence of instruction

9, the court instructed:
"It is your duty to answer each question,
clearly, frankly and honestly and in accordance
with the evidence in the case."
(R. 54) (Emphasis
added)
The form of verdict contains six written questions.
(R.

44-45)
The jury answered only question number 1 and part of

question 6.

Question 6 was as follows:

"(6) Without regard to any of the previous
questions, and your answers thereto, state the
amount of damages sustained by the Plaintiffs as
a result of the occurrence."
"Special damages sustained
by Plaintiff Jerald Kilpack

$ ____________

General damages sustained
by Plaintiff Jess Kilpack
(R.

$ ____________

45)

The court's instruction number 10 instructed the jury
that it should determine such amounts of money as would reasonably
compensate the Plaintiffs for injuries and losses resulting from
the occurrence, including the reasonable expense of necessary
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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medical care received and the reasonable expense of necessary
medical care, hospitalization and treatment reasonably certain to
be needed in the future which the court defined as special dama~•·
Instruction number 10 further directed the jury that general
damages consisted on pain, suffering,

disabilities or disfigure-

ments and any accompanying mental anquish suffered by the Plaintiff
Jess Kilpack to date and those reasonably certain to be experienced
in the future.

(R. 55)

It was stipulated that the Plaintiff Jerald Kilpack had
incurred $4,738.63 in medical expense for the treatment of Jess
Kilpack to the time of trial and it was further stipulated that
if questioned concerning the matter, the Plaintiff Jerald L. Kilpack
would testify that $856.00 had been incurred in necessary travel
expense in obtaining medical treatment for a total of $5,594.63 -the exact sum set forth by the jury as special damages in response
to the first part of question 6 above quoted.

(R. 35, 45)

No

figure was inserted in the blank for general damages.
Four doctors testified at trial regarding the need for
continued medical treatment for Jess Kilpack, three for the
Plaintiff and one for the Defendant.

The three doctors who testi-

fied for Plaintiff consisted of Doctor Duane E. Davis, a Urologist,
Dr. Robert H. Lamb, an Orthopedic Surgeon, and Dr. Dennis D. Thoen,
a Neurologist.

Dr. George W. Middleton, a Urologist, testified

for Defendant.
A portion of the testimony of each doctor regarding the
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nature and extent of the child's permanent injuries and his need
for continued medical tratment is contained in a forty-page
partial transcript which the Clerk has identified as page 142 of
the record.

The below references to the Transcript refer to such

portion of the record.
Dr. Duane E. Davis, the physician who performed the
emergency operation on the child just after the accident {Exhibit
14) and to whom the child has been returned periodically for treatment, testified that the child has a scar or stricture in the urethra at the point where it was severed in the accident which must
be stretched periodically and that the stricture was a permanent
condition.

{Tr. 13,15)

Dr. Davis testified the child would have

to undergo urethral dilations at at least three month intervals
for the time being and that his present office costs of such procedure was $16.50; that such cost was expected to increase; that
substantial medical risks were associatedwiththe necessity of
undergoing periodic urethral dilation; and that the child had at
least a fifty percent chance of ultimately requiring an operation
known as urethroplasty to reconstruct the stricture area, a procedure costing from $800.00 to $1,000.00.

(Tr. 19-24)

Dr. Davis explained that even after urethroplasty, the
medical risks and problems remained the same, since urethroplasty
was essentially a procedure of substituting a "better" scar for
one that had become too difficult to treat by means of dilation.
(Tr. 22-25)
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Dr. Robert H. Lamb testified that the child vas •certainly likely" to develop traumatic arthritis in his left sacrailiac joint and associated problems in his lower lumbar area fro.
which he would suffer pain and that from an orthopedic and neuromuscular standpoint, the child had a JOt permanent partial disability insofar as his orthopedic and neuromuscular injury vas concerned, which he wwld

Ca.Irf

i:cespect:ive of the application of available

medical procedures in an effort to minimize the child's permanent
problems arising from the effects of the crush injury to his
pelvis.

(Tr. 26-27)
Dr. Dennis D. Thoen testified that the child's condition

was such that he was not going to get any more neurological return
and that the child's musculature would have to try to compensate
for permanent orthopedic and neurological difficulties.

(Tr.28-29)

Dr. Thoen further testified that there was a strong
probability that the child would have difficulty with his genital/
urinary system in terms of achieving erections later in life, that
the child already had developed a scoliosis which would require
orthopedic attention and associated and related problems giving
the child a condition about the spinal cord called spinal stenosis
which has very devastating physical effects on its victims.

(Tr.

3 0-3 3)

Defendant's medical expert, Dr. George Middleton, a
urologist testified that the odds were that the child would have
continuing stricture disease; that he thought it unreasonable that
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that the child should be dilated
every three months for sixty years and that he would prefer to
try to repair the stricture by means of urethroplasty

(Tr. 34-

35)
When asked his opinion as to the probability the child
would have to undergo urethroplasty,

Dr. Middleton stated:

"judging by the fact that he has been dilated every three months,
its almost a certainty."

(Tr. 35)

The facts relative to the voir

dire issues are as

follows:
After the first jury was questioned by the court,
Plaintiff's counsel approached the bench concerning other questions in written form which Plaintiff desired to have the court
propound to the jury.

(Tr. 2-3)

The trial court declined to

itself ask any of the questions, except that the court did ask a
question which it evidently deemed sufficient to cover the issue
of whether the jurors were associated with or owned stock in any
casualty insurance company, to wit:
in any corporate enterprise?"

"Do any of you own any stock

(Tr. 2)

As to the other questions Plaintiff wanted the court
to put to the jury, the court required counsel for Plaintiff to
state the question in front of the jury so that the court could
decide whether or not it would be put to the panel.

(Tr. 3)

The court then permitted Plaintiff's counsel to ask the court to

-20-
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instruct the jury that sometimes insurance exists and sometimes
it does not exist in personal

injury actions and to inquire of

the jurors as a group whether any juror owned stock in any casualty insurance company or is in the business or has previously
been in the business of solicitmgfor the sale of insurance or had
previously been in the business of adjusting claims or had otherwise in the past or present been an officer, employee or member
of an

insurance company.

(Tr. 3)

The court inquired whether

any juror would answer the question yes, and one juror indicated
ownership of some stock in a National Variable Life company.

The

court did not follow up on the matter, but required Plaintiff's
counsel to ask

the court to inquire of the jury as to other

matters, nos:t of which requests the court denied, to wit:

inquiry

as to the jurors acquaintance or non-acquaintance from their
background and experience with the conduct and characteristics of
young children; inquiry concerning ability of individual jurors
based on their background in assessing injuries to a child; inquiry
as to jurors personal philosophy or feelings against the fault
system and in awarding monetary compensation if liability is
found;

inquiry concerning distaste of jurors for medical evidence

concerning the injuries to the child.

(Tr. 4-5)

The court did

grant counsel's request to inquire of the jury as to their personal involvement in farming operations and ascertained that only
three of the jurors had no farming experience, but the court
would not permit any further inquiry and in particular refused
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization
-21- provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Plaintiff's request to ask the jurors whether their farming experiences would give them a problem in properly listening to and evaluating Plaintiff's case where Defendants were engaged in farming
operations at the time.

The court refused to inquire of the jury

on that matter, prefering instead to simply tell the jury they
could answer the following with a yes or no answer:
"Do any of you have any reason why you feel
you cannot on this case l~sten to the evidence,
the law as I state it to you at the conclusion
of the evidence, and based solely on that evidence
and that law and nothing else, render(ing) a fair
and just verdict as between the parties?"
(Tr. 6-7)
Of course no juror responded in the affirmative.
The court did ask the jurors whether any had been sued
or had brought suit because of injuries and one juror responded
that she had been involved in a law suit with doctors and simply
did not like doctors.

The court said "would that fact cause you

to be predisposed to find for or against either party without regard to the evidence and the law?"

The juror did not directly res-

pond to that, but only stated "well, there were Provo doctors I
imagine these are Payson ones".
further inquiry.

And the court thereafter cut off

(Tr. 7-8)

After Joel Kilpack testified, counsel for the Defendants
made a motion for a mistrial on the ground Plaintiff had injected
the matter of insurance by asking whether ony of the jurors were
stockholders in a casualty insurance company.
granted the motion, stating:

"!·1r.

(Tr. 9)

The court

Cook, I have been down this roac
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so many times it gives me a sick feeling in the diaphram.• (Tr.lO)

ARGUMENT
POINT I
NEITHER SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE NOR REASONABLE
INFERENCES SUPPORT THE JURY'S VERDICT
THAT NEITHER DEFENDANT WAS NEGLIGENT
The trial court instructed the jury that negligence was
a failure of a person to do something a reasonably careful person
would do or the act of a person in doing something a reasonably
careful person would not do measured by all the circumstances then
existing,

(R. 48); that it was the duty of a driver of a motor

vehicle to use reasonable care under the circumstances in driving
the vehicle to avoid danger to himself and others and to observe
and be aware of the conditions at the time and place and under the
circumstances then existing and in the same instruction further
instructed the jury that:
"In this connection it is necessary to exercise
greater caution for the protection and safety of a
young child than for an adult person. One dealing
with children must anticipate the ordinary behavior
of children.
The fact that they usually cannot and
do not exercise the same degree of prudence for
their own safety as adults, they often are thoughtless and impulsive, imposes a duty to exercise a
degree of vigilance and caution commensurate with
such circumstances in dealing with children." (R.Sl)
Plaintiff submits that the trial court should have taken
judicial notice of the hazard to small children of permitting them
to ride on the running board of the hay truck bouncing through
an open field immediately ahead of the rear dual wheels of that
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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truck and permitting some of them to jump back and forth, crawl
in and out the window and drag along, hanging onto the truck.

See

Butler vs. Sports Haven International,563 P.2d 1245 (Utah 1977),
in which this Court held judicial notice should be taken of the
hazard to small children of an open swimming pool.

The trial court

should have granted Plaintiff's motion for a directed verdict on
the issue of the liability of the DefenGants because reasonable
persons, conscientiously and deliberately applying the law could
not conclude that Defendants exercised reasonable care i.e. greater
than ordinary caution for the protection and safety of the five smal:
children and reasonably exercised a degree of vigilance and caution
commensurate with the circumstances when they took five small children out with them to the hay field knowing full well their attentioc
would be directed to gathering hay bales; that the truck and bale
loader would be noisy; that the children had not been out to the
hay field before and had no experience, except for one older boy
who had not been on the running board before anyway, and then permitted children of the age of 5, 6 and 7 years to actually crawl
out the window of the moving truck and down on the running board
and observe them in that perilous position and do absolutely nothu:
to prevent the inevitable from occurring.
Submitting the issue of Defendant's negligence to the
jury under the circumstances was tantamount to inviting them to
speculate that farmers have special privileges above all.
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Perhaps

most of the members of the jury were closely associated with
farmers or visualized themselves in busy farming operations vbere
it would be inconvenient to be bothered with taking thought about
the physical welfare of small inexperienced, excited children.
Knowingly permitting them to play on the outside of a mo•ing
farm truck for a good ten or fifteen minutes before one of thea
was crushed was grossly negligent.
Plaintiff submits that not even "a mere scintilla• of
evidence arises from the testimony, which is undisputed in its
material particulars, which could in reason be argued to support
the proposition that the Defendants did in fact use reasonable
care under the circumstances and did exercise that greater degree
of caution for the protection and safety of a young child required
by law.

The jury's verdict of no negligence cannot be sustained.

The trial court judgment of no cause of action and its refusal to
grant judgment on the liability issues notwithstanding the verdict
must be reversed even under the rigorous standards for review of
the jury's verdict set forth in the cases of McCloud vs. Baum, 569
P.2d 1125 (Utah 1977); Koer vs. Mayfair Markets, 431 P.2d 566 (Utah
Helman vs. Sacred Heart Hospital, 62 Wash.2d 136, 381 P.2d 605
cited in Hyland vs. St. Marks Hospital, 427 P.2d 736 (Utah 1967)
(dissenting opinion of Justice Callister).
POINT II
NO SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE NOR REASONABLE INFERENCES
EXIST UPON WHICH THE JURY COULD REASONABLY FIND
JESS KILPACK GUILTY OF CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE
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Plaintiff's primary point is that

under no reasonable

view of the evidence could the jury have found the small excited
7-year old child guilty of contributory negligence so the trial
court should not have submitted the issue of the child's contributory negligence to the jury and that upon retrial, the sole issue
which should be submitted to the jury is the issue of damages.
If this Court does not so hold, then Plaintiff urges the
Court to direct the lower court to instruct the jury, upon retrial:
1)

That the law presumes the child incapable of con-

tributory negligence, a presumption Defendants must overcome by
reasonable evidence to the contrary, and,
2)

That Defendants had a legal duty to observe extra

care for the child's safety once they knew he was in a position of
obvious peril on the running board outside Defendant's moving hay
truck.
As to Plaintiff's primary point, Plaintiff submits that
a jury could not reasonably find the little seven-year old child
acted unreasonably for a seven-year old who had never been out on
a hay truck before, who had never ridden outside a truck before,
who had received no instructions, direction or warning about the
matter, and who watched an older brother and older cousin for
some time before trying to follow them.
The only reasonable, conrnon sense conclusion that can

be

arrived at from the evidence is that the little seven-year old boy
did exactly what would be expected of a younger brother anxious
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to help and do as his older brother and cousin were doing.

No

7-year old child would have had any appreciation at all of the
fact that the dual wheels of the truck were followinq just a few
feet behind and extending as far out as that runninq board.

No

7-year old would have any idea that if he fell while climbing out
or riding or after jumping he would be run over by the trucks rear
dual tires as it manuvered and rolled through the field.

Such things

were totally out of his experience and could not in reason be expected to be in the child's mind.
for him.

It was a brand new experience

He could see how his older brother and cousin were par-

ticipating and helping by arranging hay bales.
2~

The child was only

months beyond the protection of a conclusive presumption of his

incapability of contributory negligence discussed below.

He was

small, very young, totally inexperienced, and without instruction.
As to the latter, David Wignall testified that all he did was to say
once to the children that they should get back in the cab, but
that was after the 7-year old was already on the running board of
the noisy truck and obviously totally insufficient for he knew
Jess did not get back in but rode back out there for another ten
minutes or so.

Nothing could be plainer than that the child did

not hear any such instruction and nothing is more common in the
life of adults commonly dealing with young children than the experlence of having those young chilGren not hear instructions when
their attention is diverted elsewhere especially in a new exciting
circumstance.
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The conduct of the child was not unreasonable for a
small excited 7-year old child under totally new circumstances as
a matter of law.
In all events, if this Court does not limit retrial to
the issue of damages, Plaintiff is entitled to have the jury properly instructed respecting defendant's contributory negligence
defense.
Jess Kilpack was born April 1, 1969 (see first page of
exhibit 14) and was just

2~

months beyond the age of seven on

June 21, 1976 when he was crushed beneath the wheels of Defendant's
partially loaded ton and a half hay truck.
In Nelson vs. Arrowhead Freight Lines, 99 Utah 129, 104
P.2d 255 (1940) this Court held:
1)

Ordinarily a child under seven years of age is con-

clusively presumed not guilty of contributory negligence.
2)

Between the ages of seven and fourteen in the absence

of a showing to the contrary, an infant is assumed not to have the
same consciousness of danger and the same judgment in avoiding it
as an adult, so that, where the infant is between seven and fourtee:
years of age, defendant has the burden of rebutting a legal presumption of incapability of contributory negligence.
Contrary to Nelson, the trial court refused to instruct
the jury that the injured child was presumed incapable of contributory negligence.

(R.

86)

Instead,

the trial court merely in-

structed the jury that Defendants had the burden of persuadinq
( R. 50)
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The trial court further refused to instruct the jury that
when a child is known to be in a situation of danger, there is a
duty to observe extra caution for his safety.

(R. 88)

Such an

instruction was requested under the authority of Rivas vs. Pacific
Finance Company, 16 Utah 2d 183, 397 P.2d 990 (1964), because Defendant David Wignall admitted he saw the 7-year old crawl out the
window of the moving truck down onto the running board and so
he was out there.

(R. 143 - Tr. 58-61)

knew

Defendant LaMark Wignall

also admitted seeing the children crawl down onto the running board
and knew they were there.

(R. 143 - Tr. 79-80, 88)

In Rivas, this Court specifically held:
. When a child is known to be in a
situation of possible danger, there is a duty
to observe extra caution for his safety."
Rivas vs. Pacific Finance Company, 16 Utah 2d 183,
397 P.2d 990, 991 (1964).
The lower court also erred in instructing the jury in
effect that the child had an absolute duty to watch out for himself:
"A person in or about a moving motor vehicle
must make reasonable use of his faculties for his
own protection.
He is required to keep a proper
lookout for his own safety and to use that degree
of care which a reasonable, careful person would
exercise measured by all the circumstances then
existing.
He does not have a duty, however, to
look for danaer when there is no reason to
apprehend any."
(R. 52) (emphasis added)
There was no justification for hanging that absolute requirement around the neck of the 7-year old child, contrary to his
actual duty

(which the lower court did include in a different
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To summarize, if the defense of contributory negligence
remains in the case for retrial, Plaintiff is entitled to have the
jury instructed that:
1) The child is presumed incapable of contributory
negligence, and
2) When the child was observed to be in a hazardous
position, Defendants incurred a duty to exercise extra caution for
his safety, and
the lower court should not instruct the jury that the child had an
absolute duty to watch out for himself on the moving vehicle,
contrary to the child's actual duty to exercise only the same care
as would be expected of children the same age, intelligence and
experience in similar circumstances.
POINT III
IRREGULARITY IN THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE JURY, MISCONDUCT OF THE JURY, INADEQUATE DAMAGES, INSUFFICIENCY OF
THE EVIDENCE TO JUSTIFY THE VERDICT AND ERROR IN LAW MA..'WATE
THE GRANTING OF A NEW TRIAL
Rule 59(a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, provides that
the court may grant a party a new trial on all or part of the iss~s
for certain causes, including irregularity in the proceedings of
the jury, misconduct of the jury, inadequate damages, insufficiency
of the evidence to justify the verdict and error in law.

Rule

59(a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
The trial court erred in denying Plaintiff's motion for
a new trial.

Plaintiff was and is entitled to a new trial on the

damage issue for the following reasons:
1.

Irregularity in the proceedings of the JUry.
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The

court's first stock instruction directed the jury to follow the
law and to determine the facts, not arbitrarily but with sincere
judgment and sound discretion.

(R. 46)

Following closing argu-

ments, the case was submitted to the jury at approximately 11:55
The jury announced that it had

a.m., Wednesday, October 4, 1978.

arrived at a verdict approximately one hour to one hour fifteen
minutes later at the conclusion of the jury's lunch period.

(R. 34)

It is manifest from the incompleted special verdict and the short
time over the noon hour during which the jury "deliberated" that
the jury could not have sincerely and conscientiously considered
the case and followed the court's instructions, erroneous though
some of them were, but instead rapidly and arbitrarily determined
the Defendants would not be liable, quite regardless of the evidence.
2.

Misconduct of the

iu~v.

The trial court's instruc-

tion 9 told the jury it was its duty to answer written questions:
" . . . Each answer is to be written in the
space provided after each question.
It is your duty to answer each
clearly, frankly an
onestly and ~n
with the evidence in the case."
(R.

added)

The form of verdict contained six written questions.
The jury answered only question number 1, ignored questions 2, 3,
4 and 5 and inserted an answer in only part of question 6, which
specifically directed the jury,

as prefaced, as follows:

"Without regard to any of the previous
questions and your answers thereto, state.the
amount of damages sustained by the Pla~nt~ffs
as a result of the occurrence:
Special damage sustained
by Plaintiff
Jerald
Kilpack
__________
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General damages sustained
by Jess Kilpack

$ ____________

(R. 45)

The jury ignored the preface above quoted, inserted no
sum in the blank for general damages and wrote in the blank for
special damages only that figure stipulated as the special damages
incurred prior to trial increased by the amount of travel expense
it was stipulated Jerald Kilpack w0uld testify about if called on
the subject.

(See R.

Thus

35, 45)

the jury totally ignored

concerning the permanence,

not only the evidence

nature and severity of the child's

injuries, but the medical evidence given by all four doctors that
the child would need continuing urethral dilations and probably
urethroplasty
care.

and ongoing expensive orthopedic and neuromuscular

( Tr . 13 , 15 , 19-2 4 , 2 5 , 2 6-2 7 , 3 0- 3 3 , 3 4-3 5 l
It was manifest jury misconduct for the jury to disregard

the court's instructions, particularly its instruction as to how
to approach the damage question.

Had the jury properly applied

the court's instructions, it would have been impossible for the
jury to have reached its results.

Eikelberger vs. Tolotti, 574 P.2:

277 (Nev. 1978); Town of Jackson vs. Shaw, 569 P.2d 1246 (Wyo. 1977 ·
The jury abused its prerogatives and ignored or misapplied
proven facts and the law given to it by the tr;al court.
Phillins net:rnl.<>ll"' Co., 10 Utah 2d 276, 351 P. 2d 952
3.

Lund vs.

(Utah 1960) ·

Inadequate damac:es appearing to have been given

under the influence of passion or prejudic~.

As stated above, t~

jury
ignored the instructions of the court, struck a line thruuc!
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the blank for general damages, ignored entirely the extensive
testimony describing the child's injuries, the lengthy emergency
operation required to save his life and the extensive permanent
injuries to his uro-genital system, nerves, bones and musculature,
and ignored the testimony given by all doctors that further medical
treatment for life would be required.

The manifest inadequacy of

the jury's damage finding itself bespeaks disregarding of instructions and disregard of the evidence or a misapprehension of the same
or shows that the verdict was influenced by passion or prejudice -perhaps by an assumption that our local farmer should not be charged
with responsibility or "such an accident could happen to any of us
farmers" or some other such notion. The patent inadequacy of the
damage assessment certainly reflects prejudice or bias against the
out-of-town Plaintiffs, plainly requiring a new trial under the
principle of Saltas vs. Affleck, 99 Utah 381, 105 P.2d 176 (1940).
4.

Insufficiency of the evidence to justify the verdict.

The discussion under Point I and the recitation of facts showing
Defendants'utter disregard for the welfare of the small children,
particularly the Plaintiff, is applicable to this point as well as
to the point that Defendants were negligent as a matter of law.

A

review of the undisputed evidence, particularly the admissions and
testimony given by Defendants leads to the inescapable conclusion
Defendants did not take garden variety, normal precautions to keep
the small children they took to the hay field out of harm's way.
failed to shut down the truck when they observed the children
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crawling out the window and down onto the running board and failed
to adequately and sufficiently instruction and caution the children
on what they could and could not do during the bale gathering
operation.
The evidence was plainly insufficient to justify the
jury's verdict of no negligence on the part of Defendants.

Arbi-

trariness, abuse or mistake is evid~nt in the jury's verdict and
the result reached is clearly offensive to any objective sense of
justice.

Holmesvs. Nelson, 7 Utah 2d 435, 326 P.2d 722 (Utah 1967):

Stack vs. Kearnes, 118 Utah 237, 221 P.2d 594

(Utah 1950) and

Hyland vs. St. Marks Hospital, 19 Utah 2d 134, 427 P.2d 736 (Utah
1967).
5.

Error in the law.

The discussion under Point I is

again applicable,requiring a new trial.
determined the issue of Defendants'

The court should have

liability as a matter of law

once the evidence was in and it became absolutely clear that
reasonable minds could not differ as to the proposition that Defendants absolutely ignored their duty to the small excited children
they permitted to accompany them on the hazardous bale gathering
operation.

It was error in law for the trial court to submit the

negligence issues to the jury.

So doing merely permitted Defen-

dants to argue to the jury that it could decide that the action
was simply one of those unavoidable happenings that shoulc1 ""t be
blamed on anyone because accidents happen to everyone, quite ionoring the court's instructions as to the legal duties involved and
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to further invite the jury to blame the accident on the child'•
sister or mother or something else absolutely extraneous to the
evidence.

Leaving that issue open under the facts of this ca•e

permitted the jury to in effect disregard the court's instruction•
number 1 and 2 and to fail to apply instructions number 6 and 8
regarding the respective duty of care of the small, excited,
inexperienced children and the heavy duty of care placed on the
adults operating the truck and machines.

It permitted the jury

to accept Defendant's argument that the child should never have
been taken to the farm in the first place, or perhaps should have
somehow been warned by his parents to anticipate that his Uncle
might permit him

to go to the hay field but to go in no event,

whether or not invited.

The evidence was clear that the small

seven year old would not have been crushed under the truck's wheels
but for Defendant's obvious fault in knowingly allow him to crawl
out the window, down on the running board and to ride and play
there in a position obviously fraught with peril for a full ten
to fifteen minutes without stopping the truck, without warning and
without even the protection of admonishment or appropriate instruction.

Leaving the fault issue open permitted the jury to speculate

that in Utah County at leas~ rapid gathering of hay bales is more
important than life and limb of five small excited children
could be ignored to fend for themselves.

who

Perhaps the jury simply

assumed the child's inj~ries were covered by some form of medical
insurance (which is not the caseh and thus felt they could rapidly
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adjourn after lunch at County expense to go out on the Elk Hunt
or to attend to other more pressing duties without really reviewing
the instructions or the evidence or the damages.
In all events, the verdict is plainly against the law
which requires adults to anticipate the actions of children and
to take reasonable precautions under the circumstances to prevent
small children in their charge from being hurt in hazardous conditions created by the adults which the child's small size, limited
physical ability, non-existence prior experience and limited judgment simply did not permit the children to appreciate and properly
or appropriately handle by themselves.
It was manifest error of law for the trial court to deny
Plaintiff's motion for a new trial.
POINT IV
THE LOI.offiR COURT ERRED IN GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR
A MISTRIAL AND IN DISCHARGING THE FIRST JURY
Defendants' answers to interrogatories disclosed that
Defendant LaMark Wignall had in force a Utah Farm Bureau Policy
and that coverage under the policy of the Plaintiff's claim was
not disputed.

(R. 131-132)

This Court has held in accordance with the general rule
that prospective jurors may be questioned on voir dire respecting
their interest in or connection with liability insurance companies.
Balle vs. Smith, 81 Utah 179, 17 P.2d 224
99 Utah 381,

105 P.2d 176

151, 140 P.2d 772

(1932); Saltas vs. Affle:

(1940); and 'lorrison

'.'S.

Perr'/• 10·1

lita'

(1943); see also 1\nnot., "Adm1ssibilit'.' of
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Co~~·

etc., Tending to Show that Defendant in Personal Injury or Death
Action Carries Liability Insurance, "4 ALR 2d 761, 792 (1949).
In Balle vs. Smith,this Court held that plaintiff waa
entitled to learn whether any juror is interested in or connected
with any casualty insurance company which may be interested in the
case, either as officer, employee, member or stockholder, but that
no impression should be conveyed that there was or was not insurance covering defendant's liability.

If the jurors answer the

question in the negative, that should be the end of the inquiry.
Balle vs. Smith does not discuss the permissible limits of followup
questions should a juror answer in the affirmative.
In Saltas vs. Affleck, supra., this Court said:
"Reasonable latitude should be given parties
in ascertaining what affiliations jurors have with
an interested party.
Here the matter should end."
Saltas vs. Affleck, 99 Utah 381, 105 P.2d 176, 179
(1940).

The inquiry Plaintiff requested the court to out to the
jury in this case certainly did not go beyond permissible limits:
"THE COURT:
Do counsel have other questions
they wish to put to the jury panel for challenge
for cause: Mr. Cook?
MR. COOK:

Yes, Your Honor.

Perhaps I could --

THE COURT:
Do you have any questions you wish
me to put to them?
MR. COOK:
Yes, Your Honor.
Mav I aooro~ch the
bench on the question of subject matter for voir dire?
(Whereupon, Mr. Cook approached the bench and handed
a document to the Court.)
THE COURT:
This is interesting. What questions
do you want me to put to the jury panel? This panel
was qualified some ti~e ago.
MR. COOK:

Yes,

I appreciate that.

THE Law
COURT:
The
questions
their
citizenship
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MR. COOK:
THE COURT:

Yes.

Number 3, Your Honor.

Do any of you --

MR. COOK:
Through the balance then would be
appropriate in my judgment.
THE COURT:
Do any of you own any stock in any
corporate enterprise?
MELVINA CROPPER:
THE COURT:

What do you mean by that?

Any General Motors stock?

JUROR CROPPER: Yes, First Security Bank.
We
own some in Mountain Bell. We own some in J. C.
Penney.
THE COURT:
not, Mr. Cook?

That takes care of that, does it

MR. COOK:
No, Your Honor, not the whole subject matter, and this is a proper inquiry.
TilE COURT:

l'lill counsel approach the bench?

(Counsel approached the bench and discussion was had
off the record.)
I will let you

~ake

your record.

Do you have any other questions, Mr. Cook, you
want me to ask? You state the question and I will
decide whether it's going to be put to the panel or
not.
MR. COOK:
Thank you, Your Honor.
I request
the Court to ask the jury the followi~g and to
instruct the jury that with respect to pecuniary
interest sometimes insurance exists and so~eti~es
it does not exist in personal injury actions, such
as this one today.
It is therefore custo~ary and
often done by the Court to inquire of the jurors as
a group whether any juror owns stock in any casualty insurance company or is in the business or
has previously been in the business of solicitlnq
for the sale of insurance or has previously been
in the business of adjustinq claims or has otherwise
in the past or present been an officer, c~cloyee,
or member of an insurance com[J~l!1~:
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THE COURT: Would any of you answer that
question yes?
Yes, Sir?
JUROR ANDREW JOLLY: I don't know if this
pertains to it.
I own a small amount of stock in
NationalVariable Life.
I think it's a life insurance company.
I don't think it deals with -THE COURT:
Tr. 3-4)

Go ahead,

Mr. Cook. (R. 142 -

Defendants' motion for a mistrial was based solely on
Plaintiff's counsel asking the court to ask the jury the question
above quoted.

(R. 142 - 9-10)

The lower court refused to follow the practice suggested
by Justice Wolfe in his dissenting opinion in Morrison vs. Perry,
104 Utah 151, 140 P.2d 72 (1943) which was that the trial judge
himself should announce that sometimes insurance exists and
sometimes it does not; that the court makes it a practice to
interrogate veniremen

en masse as to whether they own stock in

or are in the business of soliciting for liability insurance or
are in the business of adjusting claims and should further tell the
jury that the jury is not to be concerned with the issue of
whether or not liability insurance exists.

Justice Wolfe further

suggested that if an affirmative answer is given as to a juror's
connection with a casualty insurer, he should be asked with which
company he is affiliated or in which he owns stock and whether
the fact of such connection would influence him in reaching a
verdict.

If not, the subject should not be further pursued
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absent special circumstances.

Justice Wolfe suggested that

counsel should advise the court as to any suggested further
questions outside the hearing of the veniremen, but that the
court itself should conduct the examination as a part of standard
practice and include an admonishment to the jury that its verdict
should be rendered without regard to the existence of liability
insurance.

Morrison vs. Perry, 104 Utah 151, 140 P.2d 772,

(1943).
The lower court obviously abused its discretion in
granting the mistrial instead of following the procedure outlined
by Judge Wolfe in the Morrison vs. Perry case.

The lower court

forced counsel for Plaintiff to ask the court to ask the question
in the presence of the jury, refusing to itself put the question
to the jury and to further instruct the jury as indicated proper
by the Morrison vs. Perry case.
Plaintiff submits that this Court should now decide that
examination of jurors for pecuniary interest in the casualty
insurer should be undertaken by the Court in every case where
liability insurance exists, including but not limited to cases li~
the instant case which is not an on highway motor vehicle case, b~
case in which the vehicle's insurance applies.

Pecuniary interest

ought to be recognized as including jurors interest as insureds
paying premiums to the defendant's insurer.
It is particularly important that this Court clarify
the matter, for reasons beyond the results in the instant case.
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First, the question of what insurance company is defending the case is probably in the minds of the jurors anyway.
all or most of whom will have driven to court in an

au~ile

upon which insurance is mandated by the Utah Safety Responsibility
Act, Section 41-12-1, et. seq.

Utah Code Annotated (1953).

Second, this Court can and should take judicial notice
that the insurance industry has been hard at work for some years
prosecuting a media and legislative campaign designed to permanently
implant in the minds of the public, particularly including those
members of the public who become jurors, the notion that the
tort liability system is grossly at fault, and that premium paying
jurors are unwittingly implicated in pulling exborbitant premiums
out of the public's pocket and their own pocket via huge awards
for unmeritorious cases.

See for example the discussion in Juris

Doctor, December 1978-January 1979 issue, page 30, describing ads
placed by Aetna Life & Casualty describing what the insurance
industry claims is a runaway trend toward the granting of excessive unjustified jury awards in accident cases, notwithstanding the
money to pay such awards comes from uninvolved parties such as
jurors, who of course must themselves pay liability insurance premiums.

Judicial notice should further be taken of the apparent

effectiveness of the insurance industry's campaign reflected by
the fact that it is now defense counsel and not plaintiff's counsel
who requests a jury, particularly in Utah County.

It is fair to

say that the result of permitting nothing to be said about insurance is to invite the jury to assume that had insurance existed,
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the case would have been settled, or since the case was not
settled, the Plaintiff probably has an unmeritorious case or is
unduly greedy, else the case would have settled.
thus unfairly stacked against Plaintiff.

The cards are

This problem is

especial~

accute in a case like this one where the jurors from a rural
area will have had farming experience or are related to farmers
and all are adults like the Defendants, and certainly if the jury
felt that Defendants were without insurance protection, they would
sympathize with their problem in paying any monetary award when
the jurors themselves could visualize children becoming injured
in their own or relatives farming operations.
Since the carrying of liability insurance is in effect
mandated by Utah's Safety Responsibility Act, and the jurors all
drive to Court in cars carrying that mandatory insurance, and
insurance has become so common anyway that the average person
serving on a jury is perfectly aware of its existence in many,
if not all, situations, ana so will be

speculating and guessing

about it anyway, instruction and inquiry must be made into juror's
interests in insurers and they must be told that the liability and
damage instructions must be applied whether or not there is insurance, regardless of media coverage of industry propaganda, or their
own biases about the matter.

Actually, since the fact of insurance

coverage is now deemed relevant to t!1e settlement of cases,
certainly a case can be made that it is also relevant to the amount
of damages which should be awarded.

If a de~endant is finanriall~
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responsible up to $50,000 or $100,000, that is a fact of great
importance.

If the insurance limit is $50,000, a defendant vho

negligently causes $500,000 in damages will usually take out
bankruptcy to avoid paying the difference anyway.
In this regard, Plaintiff submits that there is no
actual empirical evidence to support the supposition that once
a jury gets the idea that Defendant is covered with some kind of
insurance, the jury is automatically going to irresponsibly ignore
all of the Court's instructions on liability and simply assess
damages in the amount of the coverage.

Insurance has now been around

a long time and is universaJly known and used.

It is demeaning to

the jury to suggest it cannot and will not appropriately handle
even very specific advice as to the fact and amount of liability
insurance coverage.
In any event, if the Court does not decide that the fact
and amount of liability insurance with appropriate cautionary
explanation and instruction should now be covered as a matter of
course, this Court should at least rule that the lower court erred
in granting the mistrial where the only question that was asked
was whether any of the jurors had a pecuniary or employment interest
in a casualty insurance company.
POINT IV
THE SUBJECT MATTER UPON WHICH PLAINTIFF SOUGHT TO
VOIR DIRE THE JURY WAS MATERIAL AND PROPER

Rule 47(a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, allows the
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trial court the right to voir dire the jury, but requires the
court to permit the parties to supplement the examination by such
further inquiry as is material and proper or to itself submit to
the prospective jurors such additional questions of the parties or
their attorneys as are material and proper.
The lower court proceeded with manifest impatience to
require counsel in the presence of the jury to ask the Court to put
certain questions to the jury theretofore submitted to the judge
in writing and then, manifesting the same impatience, the effect
of which was certainly not lost on the jury, refused to make inquiry
into the jury's acquaintance with conduct and characteristics of
young children, the jury's acquaintance with and ability to assess
injuries to a small child; any personal philosophies held by
jurors or feelings against the fault system that might give them
a problem in following the court's instructions that if liability
should be found a reasonble and proper and fair monetary compensation should be awarded; the jury's possible aversion or distaste
for description of traumatic injuries; the jurors experience as
farmers and whether that would give any of them difficulty in
properly evaluating and giving proper consideration to Plaintiff's
case where the Defendants were farmers.

(R. 142 - Tr. 4-8)

The trial court basically took the position that it was
not necessary to allow counsel for Plaintiffs to inquire into any
voir dire subject matter long enough to qet qenuine responses as t:
juror background matters which would obviously have an effect en
the way they vio1,·ecl the evidence or oral commitments frolll the
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··

that they would conscientiously listen to the evidence and the
instructions and give Plaintiff's case fair consideration regardless of personal experiences a proper voir dire would require
them to recognize in their own background which might give them
a bias.
The trial court presumed instead that the whole subject
matter could be covered rapidly and sufficiently with the following
kinds of inquiry.
"Ladies and Gentlemen, you have heard a
little bit about what this case is about by way
of preliminary proceeding. You have heard no
evidence.
Do any of you,and I won't press this
further than a yes or now answer, do any of you
have any reason why you feel that you cannot on
this case listen to the evidence, the law as I
stated it to you at the conclusion of the evidence,
and based solely on that evidence and that law and
nothing else, rendering a fair and just verdict
as between the parties?

•••

Have any of you ever brought suit or been
sued because of injuries to somebody?"
(Juror Melvina Cropper held up her hand)
"THE COURT: Would that fact cause you to
be predisposed to find for or against either
party in this case? Mrs. Peterson?
JUROR MARY PETERSON:
I don't know if this
counts or not, but we have been involved in a
law suit over a building with some doctors and
I don't like them.
Those doctors.
THE COURT: Would that fact cause you to
be predisposed to find for or against either
party without regard to the evidence and the
law?
JUROR PETERSON: Well, they were Provo doctors,
I imagine these are Payson ones. (They were not.)
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THE COURT:

Anything further, Mr. Cook?"

(R. 142 - Tr. 6-8)
The problem with rushing things along in such fashion
is that jurors are simply not able to assess and evaluate their
own feelings and prejudices in any meaningful manner.
No juror is going to affirmatively answer a question
such as "would that fact cause you to be predisposed to find for
or against either party without regard to the evidence and the
law?"
Then for the Court to exhibit impatience and hostility
towards counsel's efforts to make reasonable inquiries which would
enable the jurors to come to terms with their feelings and attitudes regarding the subject matter in the case is to tell the
jurors counsel is certainly out of line and someone not to be put
up with very long, and, inferentially, someone not to be listened
to--someone who is perhaps wasting the valuable time of this court,
etc., and that is hardly conducive to getting off on the right
foot with the jury.
Plaintiff most earnestly therefore requests this Court
to hold that "material and proper questioning" consists, as a
minimum, in proceeding with enough voir dire in a non-hostile
environment to permit counsel for both sides to start the trial
with some reasonable confidence that the jury has at least been
given a genuine opportunity to do a little soul searching about
matters of implied bias and to start hearing the evidence with
a genuine commitment to the system of justice, having been proper:
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encouraged to make a genuine effort to lay aside all hostilities
and biases brought to the Courtroom, and genuinely eo, as a
matter of faithful participation in the proceeding.
It is manifestly impossible for the objective of voir
dire to be achieved by inquiring in substance, •do all of you
feel you can be fair?"

Of course, no one is going to speak up

in front of the group and say they cannot be fair.

Such pushed,

rushed inquiry is simply worse than nothing so far as the intent
of Rule 47 (a) is concerned.
It was material prejudicial error for the lower court to
preclude counsel for Plaintiff from inquiring into the material
and proper matters above set forth.
CONCLUSION
The facts, which were largely undisputed, and were
not disputed in any material particular, make Defendants negligence
clear as a matter of law.

It was error for the lower court to

submit the issue of Defendants' negligence to the jury.
The undisputed evidence leaves no room for reasonable
minds to disagree that Defendants did not meet their burden of
proving the seven-year old child contributorily negligent.

The

defense of negligence should not have been and should not be
submitted to the jury.

The case should be remanded for a retrial

upon the issue of damages only.
If the Court does not decide the new trial should be
limited to the issue of damages, Plaintiff is entitled to a new
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trial on all issues in any event because:
1)

The jury was improperly instructed as to the

2)

The jury obviously did not consider or follow

child's duty.

the court's instructions on liability.
3)

The jury failed to follow the court's instruc-

tions with respect to answering the damage questions.
4)

The jury gave manifestly inadequate damages

apparently under the influence of passion or prejudice.
5)

The evidence is not sufficient to justify

the no cause of action verdict.
The Court erred in declaring a mistrial and discharging
the first jury and in failing to accord Plaintiff proper voir
dire upon material and proper matters.
This Court should decide that the subject of insurance
should be made a matter of proper jury instruction by the Court
in all cases where liability insurance exists.
Upon retrial, the lower Court should be instructed to
allow sufficient opportunity for voir dire upon matters of bias
without impatience or hostility, and to permit counsel for both
sides to inquire as to matters of actual or implied biases
held by the jurors appropriately and to obtain genuine oral
commitments from the jurors to recognize and deliberately lay
aside what unconscious biases thev miqht have affecting the case
for the purpose of doino

1ustl~C

in the cause.
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RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 26th day of February,
1979.

OOK
torney for Plaintiff
85 West 400 North
Bountiful, Utah 84010

Served the foregoing Brief of Appellant by mailing two
copies thereof to Stephen G. Morgan, Attorney for Defendants,
345 South State Street, Suite #200, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
this 26th day of February, 1979.
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